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INTRODUCTION

NJUNE 18, 1996, the Commission of the European Union
J(E.U.) secured a mandate' to negotiate, on behalf of the
Member States,2 a global "Open Skies"' agreement with the
United States. The mandate is split into two successive phases
covering, on the one side, soft rights,4 foreign ownership,5 and
cabotage, 6 and on the other side, hard rights.7 The relevance
and scope of this newly-acquired authority granted to the E.U.
Commission by this mandate necessitates an understanding of
the background in which it arises. First, according to Neil Kin(

On June 18, 1996, the European Community transport ministers rewarded
the two-year efforts of Neil Kinnock, the E.U. Transport Commissioner since
1994, by granting the European Commission a mandate to initiate multilateral
talks with the U.S. on behalf of the 15 Member States. This mandate, resulting
from last minute compromises, is a reflection of the ambivalent attitudes of the
individual Member States toward losing more sovereign control over a matter
that international and national traditions customarily consider an appanage of
national pride. The ministers reached an agreement on principles, but they did
not complete a negotiation brief. Commission's Multilateralism Mandate Comes in
Phases, Maybe Too Late, AVIATION EUROPE, June 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10773248.
2 Only 14 out of the 15 Member States voted in favor of the mandate. REUTER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, June 18, 1996, at 3.
3 See infra note 9.
4 Soft rights, in civil aviation, are rights granted to the airlines of the signatory

states of a bilateral or multilateral agreement in the territory of another signatory
that do not, by themselves, have direct economic value. Soft rights typically include ground handling at airports, services, maintenance, and more recently,
computer reservation systems or code sharing. They are accessory to the exercise
of hard rights. See infra note 7.
5 See infra notes 68-70.
6 See infra note 18.
7 Hard rights are principally the traffic rights defined by the Chicago Convention. See infra part IIA. They have direct economic value because they give access to routes, hence to markets. This Comment focuses on scheduled air traffic
rather than on charter traffic of goods and passengers which has historically been
treated differently. An accessory to routes, slots at airports have progressively
gained economic value as airports become increasingly congested. They are key
to the efficient, economic exploitation of air rights. They could, for that reason,
be included in hard rights although traditionally they are treated as soft rights.
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nock, Transport Commissioner of the E.U., the European civil
aviation sector will be legally and formally liberalized by April of
1997.8 Second, the U.S. policy of "conquer and divide"9 through
bilateral Open Skies agreements10 is reaping results." Third,
public international air law, involved in economic regulation of
air travel, is in a general state of confusion. 12 Fourth, the airline
8 See Neil Kinnock, Address to the European Transport Conference-The Liberalization of the European Aviation Industry, London (September 16, 1996),
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text evaluating the validity of this statement.
9 See Kinnock, supra note 8, referring to a statement made by U.S. Secretary of
Transportation Pena in 1994 in response to the European Union's inability or
unwillingness to pursue negotiations with the United States toward a multilateral
Open Skies agreement. The U.S. efforts at that time came as a result of the report of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong and Competitive Airline
Industry, which stated:
The principal challenge for our country is to fashion a new, growthoriented international aviation framework that allows U.S. airlines
to use their competitive strengths and international air services to
realize their full potential. This goal will require a clear and decisive shift in policy by the United States away from the present system of bilateral regulation of air services to one based on
multinational arrangements that may be regionalized at first, but
eventually cover the globe.
Daniel C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade in InternationalAirline
Services, 3 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 262 (1994). Hedlund makes a strong argument that "[t]he bilateral system is . .. incapable of supporting the continued
expansion and globalization of the international air transport industry, and must
be replaced by a multilateral regime." Id. at 299. "The key to any meaningful
liberalization lies with the United States and the E[uropean] U[nion]," using the
bilateral Open Skies between the United States and the Netherlands as a model.
Id. at 298. The U.S.-Netherlands agreement, the first liberal Open Skies agreement, was entered into in 1992. Agreement to Amend the Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 3, 1957, U.S.-Neth., 12 U.S.T. 837, as amended, and the Protocol
Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport Agreement of 1957,
Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088, as amended, Oct. 14, 1992, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No.
11976.
10On Open Skies agreements, see generally Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the ProtectionistGrip on InternationalCivil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. Rv. 435,
446-52 (1994).
11 See infra part III.A. (evaluating the effects of the U.S. policy to enter into
Open Skies agreement with certain European countries, whether or not they are
members of the European Union).
12 See Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Public InternationalAir Law: Examining Its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industry, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 425, 443-46 (1996) (arguing that the system of bilateral
agreements has created an unmanageable and inefficient web of over 4,000
agreements worldwide and that the underlying principle of individual state sovereignty of the Chicago Convention does not reflect the unequal economic bargaining power of the individual states). See also Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Would
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industry is either supporting or opposing changes, depending
on its particular economic interests of the moment.' 3
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the stakes in the
negotiation of a global Open Skies agreement between the U.S.
and the E.U. These negotiations arise in a context far more
favorable to the United States than to the E.U. for reasons
(mostly extraneous to any action taken by the United States)
that result from the European Union's internal policy regarding
competition in the civil aviation industry and the absence of a
common external E.U. policy. The present success of the E.U.
Commission in securing its long sought mandate is but a first
and limited step toward a common external policy. This Comment argues that the E.U. Commission nonetheless could turn
its present predicament into an opportunity to advance competition and economic stability, both on the home front and in
relations with the U.S. Any advance in competition and economic stability in a globalized U.S.-E.U. market will benefit the
U.S. airline industry, but cannot be achieved without changes
that only the E.U. Commission can bring about.
In order to provide the general background to the argument
that the U.S. airlines can benefit from a global U.S.-E.U. Open
Skies agreement, the next section explores the evolution of the
legal framework pertaining to civil aviation in the E.U. Thereafter, Part III reviews the stakes in the negotiations between the
United States and the European Union and its individual Member States. Finally, Part IV will outline possible avenues for
reaching improved competition on the trans-Atlantic routes in a
global context.

Competition in Commercial Aviation Ever Fit Into the World Trade Organization?, 61 J.
L. & COM. 793 (1996) (analyzing the development of the legal framework of
civil aviation and the possibility or desirability of a multilateral system under the
aegis of the WTO).
13 British Airways and American Airlines are pushing for an Open Skies agreement between the U.S. and the United Kingdom while United Airlines wants the
British Airways-American Airlines alliance first reviewed under U.S. antitrust
rules. Delta opposes the linkage of antitrust immunity and Open Skies. Competing studies of the potential anti-competitive effects are circulating throughout the
industry. See Carole A. Shifrin, Delta-ContinentalTalks Could Spur Global Links, AviATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 9, 1996, at 24.
AIR
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HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION

Civil aviation emerged throughout the world shortly after the
turn of the century. World War I brought home the importance
of controlling air space to ensure national security. The exploits
of the "Red Baron" and other aviators inexorably extended the
battlefields into air space. In 1919, as a result of this new dimension of conflicts, the first multilateral attempt to regulate international air traffic was made in Paris.
The Paris Convention affirmed the principle of state sovereignty over air space, 4 thus forcing the aviation industry into a
maddening web of national regulations and international compromises. These compromises paved the way for the second
multilateral codification of international air traffic, which took

place in Chicago in 1944 as World War II ended.15 Indeed,
while the security concerns regarding air space had not weakened, the economic importance of air travel had grown. The
resulting agreement preserved state sovereignty as the means of

protecting national security, and identified the economic components vital to the development of civil air traffic. It also laid a
framework for granting defined air rights among signatory
states.1 6 That agreement is universally known as the Chicago

Convention.

7

A.

CHICAGO CONVENTION

The Chicago Convention of 1944 defines the so-called "Freeu and is the baseline for all bilateral agreedom of Air Rights""
14 Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. See Vamos-Goldman, supra note
12, at 430.
15 See Abeyratne, supra note 12, at 795-99 (discussing, inter alia, the competing
views of the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1944 Chicago
Conference).
16 See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
17 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention].
18 The FirstFreedom of the air grants a civil aircraft the right to fly over a country without landing; the Second Freedom grants the right to land in another country
for non-commercial reasons like refueling or maintenance; the Third Freedom
grants the right to maintain transportation from the carrier's home country to
another country; the Fourth Freedom entities the carrier to carry traffic from another country to its home country; the Fifth Freedom is an extension of the Third
and Fourth Freedoms, which grants the carrier the right to pick up passengers
and goods in the other state in order to carry them into a third state as long as
the flight originates or terminates in its home country. The combination of
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ments through which countries grant one another true and
commercially valuable rights of access to their air space and territory. The underlying principles of the Chicago Convention
are a state's sovereignty over its air space and the equal right of
all signatories to participate in international air transportation.19
Regardless of the size of the country, the economic might of its
airline(s) (whether state- or privately-owned), or the competitiveness of its market, each signatory trades rights of access with
each and all other countries presumably on equal footing.
The trade of air rights eventually led to the worldwide signing
of over 4,000 bilateral agreements.2 0 The multiplication of bilateral agreements was, however, not a necessary consequence of
the Chicago Convention;2 1 quite the contrary is true.2 2 Bilateral
agreements were annexed to the Chicago Convention, but only
the Inland and Air Services Transport Agreement, which dealt
with over-flight and technical stops (the first two freedoms of
the air), garnered enough signatures to come into effect. The
Third and Fourth Freedoms thus creates connections between two countries. For
example, a route from Singapore to London via San Francisco starts in Singapore
under the Third Freedom and carries on from San Francisco under the Fourth
Freedom. Such a combination is also known as Sixth Freedom, even though it was
not formally stated by the Chicago Convention. If a Fifth Freedom flight is not
part of a route that originates or terminates in the home country, it is also known
as Seventh Freedom. The right of a foreign-owned airline to pick up traffic in one
inland point and carry it to another inland point is known as the Eighth Freedom,
or more generally as the freedom of cabotage. The Chicago Convention specifically prohibits cabotage unless expressly granted by the state. See generally Hedlund, supra note 9, at 265-68; Jurgen Basedow, Airline Deregulation in the European
Community-Its Background, Its Flaws, Its Consequencesfor E.C.-U.S. Relations, 13J.L.
& COM. 247, 248-50 (1994); Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938
U.S. Aviation Policy into theJet Age, 26 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 143, 147-48 (1994).
19 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention stands for the absolute sovereignty principle; meaning that, unless granted by agreements, there is no freedom of traffic
in a foreign country. Most countries are parties to Appendix III of the Chicago
Convention (Two Freedoms Agreement), which grants first and second freedom
rights. All other rights are part of bilateral agreements. Article 5 of the Chicago
Convention treats non-scheduled international air service differently from scheduled traffic under Article 6. Article 6 restricts access to the air rights granted by
sovereign states. See Chicago Convention, supra note 17; see also Vamos-Goldman,
supra note 12, at 431-34.
20 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 12, at 427-28. All bilateral agreements are
deposited with the Legal Department of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO was created by the Chicago Convention to implement
the Convention's regulatory and coordinating objectives. See id.
21 See supra note 17.
22 See supra note 19. See also Vamos-Goldman, supra note 12, at 452.
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International Air Transport Agreement, as a multilateral alternative covering traffic rights, was a failure.
Through bilateral grants of rights of access under the framework of the Chicago Convention, the United States has been
very successful in securing routes for American carriers. In a
world in which economic disparities prevail and where nationalism clouds efficient economic choices, it is hardly surprising that
the economically powerful, or those detached from nationalistic
politics, have become the beneficiaries of a system not designed
to account for regional or economic differences. For example,
Dutch KLM, left by its government to make economically rational choices because subsidies were not an option, and the
American carriers, left to succeed or fail after the deregulation,
have been very successful in deriving benefits from the bilateral
policy of their respective governments against the background
of the intrinsic inability of the Chicago bilateral system to accommodate the emergence of a European market as a single
economic entity in the field of civil aviation. In this context, the
expansion from beyond point traffic to Fifth Freedom was
doomed to lead to a response by the E.U. Commission; namely,
to seek the very mandate it has received. Though imperfect, it
reflects the political emergence of a need created by the economic conditions and internal competition within the European Community. It is an unavoidable biproduct of the
liberalization in the E.U. and the competitiveness, if not competition, of carriers deprived of regular state subsidies.2 3 France's
renunciation of its bilateral agreement with the United States in
1992 was an early manifestation of these tensions. 24 Limitations
on access to slots, as evidenced at Heathrow, is a more recent
25
one.
23 See Council Resolution of October 24, 1994, on the Situation in European
Civil Aviation, 1994 O.J. (C 309) 1919. "[T]o prevent distortions of competition
for European aviation, State aids which have or might have negative effects on
competition, must be ruled out." Id. See also Commission Guidelines on the Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State Aid in the Aviation Sector, 1994 O.J. (C 350) 5. For a general
discussion of state aids in the E.U., see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aid Control
in the European Union: Success orFailure?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1212 (1995). For
a recent decision in the matter of indirect fiscal aid given to German airlines in
the form of accelerated depreciation, see European Commission Decision 296/
369, 1996 O.J. (L 146) 42.
24 See Commission, U.S. Prepare to Review Air France Alliances with U.S. Carriers,

AVIATION EUROPE,

Oct. 24, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 10774017.

Carriers with historical presence at Heathrow, especially British Airways,
benefit from this de facto anti-competitive scheme. See U.K Authorities Ask for
25
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The Fifth Freedom, which guarantees the right to carry traffic
from the granting state to a third state,2 6 is one of the fundamental reasons the E.U. Commission was able to secure its mandate for global negotiations with the United States because it is a
source of disturbance of internal competition.27 For example,
an American airline, using Fifth Freedom rights, can fly into the
Netherlands, pick up traffic, and continue its route to Frankfurt,
Germany. If one looks at the European Union as a single market, it creates, in practice, a right to carry traffic from one inland
point to another inland point. This is the definition of cabotage.2 8 The combination of Fifth Freedom rights with Sixth
Freedom rights expands the opportunities for cabotage, since
the carrier can fly into the country granting Sixth Freedom
rights as part of a route that is otherwise not connected to the
carrier's home country. In addition, under Open Skies agreements, this may even include a change of gauge.2 9 The impact
of this issue will be revisited in Part III of this Comment.
When existing bilateral agreements (those that are not Open
Skies agreements) would limit access by use of a Fifth Freedom
right granted by a third country, the economic objective may,
nonetheless, be achieved through stock ownership of 49.9%31 of
a European carrier that has free cabotage rights in the European Community as of April 1, 1997.31 These examples preview
the difficult task ahead for the E.U. Commission as it sets out to
negotiate a multilateral Open Skies agreement with the United
States. A general understanding of E.U. political institutions is
necessary in order to comprehend the E.U. Commission's role
and ambitions with respect to trans-Atlantic civil aviation.

Alliance Changes as Open Skies Stall, AviATION DAILY, Dec. 9, 1996, available in 1996

WL 11116603.
26
27
28

See supra note 18.
See Kinnock, supra note 8.
See supra note 18.

29 This is embodied in the third policy of a Department of Transportation Order of August 1992. See In the Matter of Defining "Open Skies," Dep't of Transp.
Order No. 92-8-13, Docket No.48, at 130 (Aug. 5, 1992). "Change of gauge" refers to "a change in the type, specifically size, of aircraft en route whereby passengers switch to another plane before reaching their final destination." Schless,
supra note 10, at 447-48.
30 See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 66.
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EC TR.A-iy

The Commission's involvement in matters relating to civil air
transportation originates in the political compromises laid by
the founding members of the European Economic Community
at its inception. The Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty), originally signed in 1957, and amended several
times over the years, is the fundamental charter of the European
Union.32 The principal political institutions created by the
treaty are the Council of Ministers (Council), the Commission,
the Parliament and the Court ofJustice.33 The Council of Ministers is a hybrid body with both executive and legislative powers.
The Council is composed of a representative from each Member
State with authority to bind the government of that State. Collectively, the Council is responsible for carrying out the goals
and objectives of the Treaty.34 It can act by non-binding recommendations or binding decisions, and regulations or directives. 35 In this respect, the Council has the last word in the lawmaking process, but the first word,3 6or right of initiative, in principle, belongs to the Commission.
The Commission is an independent body whose members are
appointed by consensus of the Member States for fixed terms of
four years. The Commission principally has executive powers to
implement and enforce Community law. It is the "watchdog" of
the Community.37 The Commission also has prospective legislative authority in formulating Community policy and preparing
proposals for legislation by the Council. This role of legislative
initiative brings the Commission to work closely with the Council. As discussed below, the evolution of the air transport policy
of the European Community clearly illustrates the interaction
between the Council and the Commission.
The Parliament consists of representatives directly elected by
the people of the Member States. Its function in relation to the
Council's legislative powers, however, is principally advisory, except that the Parliament exercises legislative authority in the
32 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224)
1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
33 SeeJohn P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where Is
It Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 923, 958-70 (1996).
34 See id. at 960.
35 See id. at 958.
36 See id. at 962-63.
37 See id. at 963.
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Community annual budget process.38 It also has supervisory
powers over the Commission. 39 The Parliament can issue nonbinding recommendations to the Council or comment on legislative proposals. In exceptional cases it has a right of action in
the Court of Justice against the Council for failure to act under
the Treaty.40 Such an action was initiated in the field of transportation and led to the declaratory decision known as the
Transport Policy decision.4 1
The Court of Justice is the highest court in the European
Union. Its main objective is to ensure the interpretation, uniform application, and development of Community law. A distinguishing feature of the Court's jurisdiction is the ability to
render advisory opinions interpreting Community law.42
Several provisions of the EC Treaty relate to transport in general and civil aviation in particular. Article 74 of the EC Treaty
provides for the mandatory implementation of a common transport policy;43 Article 75 empowers the Community with the necessary authority to carry this out;44 Article 84, however: (1)
limits the scope of the common transport policy to transportation by "rail, road and inland waterway," 45 and (2) provides that
the Council may extend common transport policy to sea and air
transport. 46 However, it was not until the adoption in 1986 of
the Single European Act, 47 which displaced the unanimous voting requirement under the Treaty, that the Council could act
upon Article 84 without facing the veto power of any single
Member State. The Single European Act introduced into EuroSee id. at 959-60.
See id. at 960.
40 See EC TREATY art. 175.
41 Case 12/83, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities,
5 E.C.R. 1513 (1985).
42 See Flaherty, supra note 33, at 967-68.
43 See EC TREATY art. 74.
44 Id.
45 See id. art. 84(1).
46 See id. art. 84(2). Air transportation between Member States of the European Union initially was regulated solely through a system of bilateral agreements
as between any signatory states of the Chicago Convention. These agreements all
contained capacity-sharing provisions, preferential treatment to the signatories'
airlines, route limitations, and access limitations; in essence, restrictions to competition within the boundaries of the European Union. Regardless of state ownership of most European airlines, the bilateral agreements were bound to
generate, if not designed to generate, distortions of competition and cartel-like
conduct of business condoned or supported by the Member States (shareholders
of the respective airlines).
47 Single European Act, July 1, 1987, 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987).
38

39
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pean politics the concept of a qualified majority. 48 Nonetheless,
what ultimately prompted the Council's decision to regulate intra-Community air transportation was the European carriers' involvement in cartel-like activities that were subject to the
competition rules of the EC Treaty, as found by the Court of
Justice in the Nouvelles Frontieresdecision.49 Credit must also be
given to the Commission for attempting to have the Council
harmonize air transport several years before the Nouvelles
Frontieresdecision.5 ' The Council's inaction, however, led to the
TransportPolicy decision.51 The threat to do "business as usual"
for the airlines and the Member States served as a powerful
trump card in the political standoff between the Commission
and the Council. A regulatory framework or the enforcement of
competition rules by the Commission was the choice faced by
the Council. Winning the political struggle, the Commission
readily traded so-called block exemptions under Article 85 (3) of
the EC Treaty for a common air transport policy. This trade-off
led to the gradual liberalization of the civil aviation industry
through what became known as the "Three Liberalization Packages." This liberalization was, however, strictly aimed at the intra-E.U. market.
C.

THE THREE LIBERALIZATION PACKAGES

1. First Package
The First Package 52 covers four areas: (1) the applicability of
Articles 85 and 86 to the civil aviation sector;53 (2) the block
exemption of airline cooperation agreements, computer reservation systems, and ground handling agreements; (3) air fare
rules; and (4) capacity sharing and market access rules. 4 This
Flaherty, supra note 33, at 944.
Cases 209-213/84, Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres), 1986 E.C.R.
1425. The application of competition rules to the air industry is examined in
part II.D, infra.
48

49

50 See Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 1 and Civil Aviation Memorandum No.
2, Progress Towards the Development of Community Air Transport Policy,
COM(84)72 final (discussed and analyzed in Paul Steven Dempsey, European Aviation Regulation: Flying Through the Liberalization Labyrinth, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 311, 341-52 (1992)).

51 See supra note 41.

1987 O.J. (L 364) 1-25; 1987 OJ. (L 374) 1.
See Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 1.
See Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9; Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 9 (block exemptions for airline agreements concerning capacity, revenue pooling, air fares, and slot allocations); Commission
52

53
54
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First Package clearly illustrates the nature of the trade-off made
between individual Member States and the European Commission. Rather than introducing sweeping changes in terms of deregulation, it changes and legalizes the framework in which the
same activities are carried out. Regulation 3975/87 may well
subject airlines to Articles 85 and 86, but Regulation 3976/87,
pursuant to Article 85 (3), is the enabling statute for rather generous exemptions from the competition rules through specific
regulations issued by the Commission. 5 Airline agreements
covering capacity sharing, revenue pooling, air fare consultation
and slot allocation were exempt under Regulation 2671/88
under rather flexible standards until January 1991. Computer
reservation systems and ground-handling agreements were also
exempt under Regulations 2672/88 and 2673/88, respectively,
without imposing very strict conditions. 6 The First Package's
air fare, capacity sharing and market access rules have also had
very limited effects,5 7 though it brought the principle of community control of civil aviation matters within the boundaries of the
European Union.
2.

Second Package
At the Commission's urging, the Council enacted the second

phase of aviation liberalization in 1990.58 The Second Package

consists of amendments to the First Package regulations, as well
as new regulations on air fares, market access, capacity sharing,
and block exemptions for fares, capacity and slot access. 59 The
Regulation 2672/88, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 13 (block exemptions for computer reservation systems); Commission Regulation 2673/88, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 17 (block
exemptions for ground handling services). See also Stacy K. Weinberg, Comment,
Liberalization of Air Transport: Time for the EEC to Unfasten Its Seatbelt, 12 U.

PA.

J.

Bus. L. 433, 433-39 (1991).
55 See Basedow, supra note 18, at 260.

INT'L

56 See Dennis A. Duchene, The Third Package Of LiberalizationIn The European Air
Transport Sector: Shying Away From Full Liberalization,23 TRANSP. L. J. 119, 127-31

(1995); Dempsey, supra note 50, at 357-63.
57 See Dempsey, supra note 50, at 359-62.
58 See Weinberg, supra note 54, at 441.
59 See Council Regulation 2342/90, 1990 o.J. (L 217) 1 (replacing Council Directive 87/601 on air fares); Council Regulation 2343/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8
(replacing Council Directive 87/602 on capacity sharing and market access
rules); Council Regulation 2344/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 15 (amending the effective date of Council Regulation 3976/87 on group exemptions from Regulation
3975/87). Later incorporated into the Second Package were Commission Regulation 82/91, 1991 O.J. (L 10) 1 (amending application dates of Commission
Regulation 2673/88; ground handling block exemption); Commission Regula-
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most significant changes toward a more competitive intra-Euro61
60
pean market relate to air fare approval, route and slot access
and capacity growth.6 2 The effects of the Second Package were
clearly not intended to change the landscape of civil aviation in
the E.U. but, more modestly, were another step toward controlled liberalization. 63 Further measures were the object of the
Third Package.
3.

Third Package
The Third Package,' introduced in 1992, replaces Regulation
2342/90 of the Second Package concerning route access and
regulation 2342/90 concerning air fares and rates. In addition,
for the first time it incorporates a licensing regulation.65 This
package demonstrates the growing commitment of the Commission and the Council to bring about a competitive intra-E.U. aviation market.
In conformity with the ambitious goal of a single European
market, the Council laid the groundwork for complete freedom
of access to routes for Community carriers within the entire European Union. The initial effect of the new route access regulation has been limited to traffic between Member States, but the
tion 83/91, 1991 OJ. (L 10) 3 (amending application dates of Commission Regulation 2672/88; and CRS block exemption); Commission Regulation 84/91, 1991
OJ. (L 10) 5 (replacing Commission Regulation 2671/88; airline agreements
block exemption-slot allocation agreements exempted).
60 Regulation 2342/90 provides for expanded flexibility zones in which price
approval is automatic, and a double disapproval system for fares that are 105%
above the referenced air fare, as well as an approval by default for fares below the
lowest flexibility zone if neither Member State on the route disapproves the fare.
The reference fare is the average normal economy airfare on the route in question. See Dempsey, supra note 50, at 364-65.
61 Third and Fourth Freedom rights are granted subject to reciprocity of the
Member State of the air carrier on a route per route basis. Fifth Freedom rights
are also granted, provided the Fifth Freedom traffic does not exceed 50% of the
capacity of the Third and Fourth Freedom service involved. See Duchene, supra
note 56, at 135-36.
62 Bilateral agreements initially provided for shared capacity on a route on a
fifty-fifty basis. The First Package increased this to a 60-40 ratio, and the Second
Package allowed for seasonal increases of up to 7.5%. See id. at 136.
63 See Werner F. Ebke & Georg W. Wenglorz, LiberalizingScheduled Air Transport
Within the European Community: From the First Phase to the Second and Beyond, 19
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 493 (1991); Duchene, supra note 56, at 132-36.
64 See Council Regulation 2407/92 on Licensing of Community Air Carriers,
1992 O.J. (L 240) 1; Council Regulation 2408/92 on Access to Intra-Community
Air Routes, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 8; Council Regulation 2409/92 on Fares and Rates
For Air Services, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15.
65 See generally Duchene, supra note 56, at 137-48.

262

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

regulation provides for complete freedom, that is full cabotage,
on domestic flights by April 1, 1997. This means that any E.U.
carrier has access to any route within the E.U. In other words,
E.U. carriers have full Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and
Eighth freedom of air rights on intra-Community routes. Limited exceptions may arise as a result of a public service obligation that a Member State may impose in order to promote
regional development when no carrier has offered service on
the route.6 6 Unfortunately, Articles 8 and 9 of the route access
regulation provide for what European policy makers often refer
to as "safeguards." These safeguards relate to: (1) the distribution of traffic between airports within an airport system (for instance Heathrow and Gatwick, which both serve London), which
a Member State may regulate provided it does so on a non-discriminatory basis; and (2) the subordination of the exercise of
air rights to Community, national, regional and local operational rules governing safety, the environment, and foremost,
slot allocations. The latter is the traditional bottleneck of civil
aviation at most European airports.6 7 Abuse of these exceptions
(for instance, the granting of favorable treatment to the national flag carrier), is investigated by the Commission on its own
motion or at the request of another Member State or of another
carrier.6" The non-discrimination rule of the route access reguSee Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 64, art. 4(1) (d). In such a case,
the state may attach an exclusivity to the route for up to three years, in order to
invite bids from carriers. See Duchene, supra note 56, at 143.
67 Slot allocation is one of the stumbling blocks in the negotiations for an
Open Skies agreement between the U.K. and the U.S. It is also the object of
particular attention by U.S., U.K. and E.U. antitrust authorities in assessing the
impact of the British Airways-American Airlines alliance. Everyone, including
the affected carriers, seems to agree that slots will have to be made available to
competitors of the alliance. The number of slots to distribute and how to make
them available, are sources of substantial disagreement. See, e.g., UK Authorities
66

Ask for Alliance Changes As Open Skies Stall,

AvIATION

DMALY, Dec. 9, 1996, at 387.

See also Agreement Relating to Air Services, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K, 60 Stat. 1499
[hereinafter Bermuda I]. Bermuda I was ratified in 1946 between the United
States and the United Kingdom, and replaced in 1977 by the more restrictive
Bermuda II: Air Transport ServicesJuly 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.C. 5367. The
contracting states are currently negotiating toward an Open Skies agreement.
6 See Council Regulation 2408/92 supranote 64, art. 8. For an application, see
Commission Decision 2408/92 of April 27, 1994 on a Procedure Relating to the
Application of Council Regulation, 1994 OJ. (L 127) 32. In that proceding,
France was found to have carried out the allocation of traffic rights in the Paris
airport system in a discriminatory manner. France was trying to protect the monopoly of Air France's subsidiary, Air Inter, on the routes between Paris (Orly)
and Marseilles. France's argument was that these exclusive routes were grand-
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lation is broader than the prohibition of discrimination based
on nationality of Article 6 of the EC Treaty,69 in that it adds the
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of the air carrier
identity. 70 A Member State may, however, impose additional restrictions on, or even deny traffic rights to, a carrier to relieve
serious congestion at an airport or to relieve existing environmental problems. The Commission has the same investigative
powers in these instances as under the exception to operational
rules. 71 Finally, the route access regulation states that capacity
limitations among carriers are illegal. Once again, the regulation provides for an exception to the prohibition if serious financial damage to a Member State's air carriers would result. In
such cases, the Member State may apply to the Commission for a
waiver.72
In the matter of air fares, the purpose of the Third Package is
to achieve market-driven fares. The approval and disapproval
system of the previous package 73 is repealed. The regulation,
however, only applies to Community air carriers, with the exception of public service obligations.7 4 The regulation further limits its own scope by establishing safeguards by which a Member
State may disapprove air fares. Under this procedure, a Member State must show injury to consumers or widespread losses
among all air carriers on the affected routes,7 5 as well as notify
all other Member States and affected air carriers. A consultation will be initiated 76 and the Commission, under certain conditions, may also conduct a review of the Member States'
decision.
fathered for three years under Article 5 of the regulation, but the Commission
disagreed because airports within an airport system are viewed as a whole. Since
France had granted traffic rights from Paris (Charles DeGaulle Airport) to Toulouse and Marseilles, France had foregone the exclusivity and was merely allocating traffic within an airport system to favor its flag carrier. See id.
69 EC TREATY art. 6.
70 See Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 64, art. 8(1). "[T] his regulation
shall not affect the Member State's right to regulate without discrimination on
grounds of nationality or identity of the air carrier the distribution of traffic between the airports within an airport system." Id.
71 See id. art. 9.
72 See id. art. 10.
73 See supra note 60.
74 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75 See Council Regulation 2409/92, supra note 64, art. 6.
76 See id.
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Council Regulation 2407/9277 organizes a common scheme
of licensing requirements for the issuance and withdrawal of operating licenses by Member States to air carriers. 7 The regulation's requirements preempt Member States' law. 79 The license
remains a state license granted by a Member State only to an
undertaking having its principal place of business located in that
Member State.8" Community ownership is the first essential requirement; it "requires that such Member States or nationals
shall at all times effectively control the undertaking."8 Financial fitness is the second requirement. It imposes upon the applicant the obligation to submit a business plan demonstrating
its ability to meet its financial obligations for the next two years
and its ability to meet its fixed and operational cost for the next
three months without income.8 2 Financial fitness is also a continuing requirement for any existing license; the regulation provides for annual reporting mechanisms and reporting of
changes in financial structure or ownership. 3 All operating
licenses existing at the time the regulation takes effect are
grand-fathered for one year.84
In 1993, the Commission enacted new regulations on airline
agreements, block exemptions, slot allocation and computer
reservation systems. 85 In April 1997, full cabotage rights were
77
78

Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64.
See Duchene, supra note 56, at 138.
See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64, art. 3.

79
80 See id. art. 4(1).

81 See Duchene, supra note 56, at 138 (citing Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(2) and
art. 2(g)). The latter provides,
Effective control means a relationship constituted by rights, contracts, or any other means which, either separately or jointly and
having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer
the possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by:
(a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; (b)
rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an undertaking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the running of the business of
the undertaking.
Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64, art. 2(g).
82 See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64, art. 4(3).
83 See generally Duchene, supra note 56, at 139-41.
84

See id. at 142.

85 See

Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 Oj. 1993 (L 155) 18; Council
Regulation 95/93, 1993 OJ. (L 140) 1; Council Regulation 3089/93, 1993 OJ. (L
278) 1; Commission Regulation 3652/93, 1992 OJ. (L 333) 37. See generally
Duchene, supra note 56, at 148-53. For a discussion of computer reservation systems, see generally Raffaele Cavani, Computerized Reservation Systems for Air Trans-
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extended to all E.U. carriers. All regulations apply to all E.U.
6
flights, whether they are purely domestic or not.
D.

COMPETITION RULES

The threat of Commission action against the anti-competitive
conduct of the European airlines brought about the liberalization packages, which created a legal framework of competition
rules that were of questionable validity. The politics of compromise led to the sacrifice of the EC Treaty's fundamental principles of competition. The Commission has changed from the
watchdog of competition rules into the shepherd of anti-competitive market participants.
The fundamental E.U. competition rules are laid out in Articles 85 through 94 of the EC Treaty. They complement the
overriding principle of undistorted competition within the E.U.
affirmed by Article 3 of the Treaty. 7 Articles 85 and 86 form the
cornerstone of competition law applicable to all private "undertakings." 88 Article 85 is the functional equivalent of a prohibition of agreements in restraint of trade. However, the focus is
not on a general prohibition of agreements among enterprises,
but rather strictly on concerted anti-competitive conduct aimed
at producing or causing harmful effects in the market place.89
The threshold requirements under Article 85(1) for agreements
or concerted practices to be considered among those "which
have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition"90 are as follows: (1) that they are legally
binding (binding agreements or practices may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence);91 (2) that they affect trade among
Member States; and (3) that the prevention, restriction or distortion be to an appreciable extent. 92 Such agreements are void
pursuant to Article 85(2). The Commission may, however, pursuant to Article 85(3), exempt a specific agreement from the
provisions of Article 85(1). The Commission must be notified
port: Remarks on the European Community Legislation, 17
454-56 (1994).

FORDHAM INT'L

L.J. 441,

See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64.
"The establishment of a system ensuring the competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market." EC TREATY art. 3(f).
88 An "undertaking" may be loosely defined as any economic venture. See PAUL
CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EC LAw: TEXT, CASES, & MATERIALS 899 (1995).
89 See Dempsey, supra note 50, at 328.
86
87

90 EC TREATY art. 85(1).

91See Dempsey, supra note 50, at 329.
See id.

92
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by the parties seeking the exemption and the following four
conditions, specified in Article 85(3), must be satisfied:
(1) The agreement must contribute to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical and economic
progress;
(2) Consumers must get a fair share of the resulting benefit;
(3) The agreement may not impose restrictions which are not
indispensable for the objectives under (1) and (2); and
(4) The agreement may not afford the parties the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect to a substantial part of the
products in question.
In applying the Article 85(3) conditions, the Commission and
the ECJ have found the following types of agreements likely to
be prohibited:
(a) agreements relating to prices and conditions of sale;
(b) limitations on markets and production;
(c) agreements whereby a vendor agrees not to compete within
the market of the purchaser;
(d) exclusive dealing agreements, such as supply agreements and
collective exclusive dealings; and
(e) joint purchasing and joint selling agreements. 93
In addition to agreement-specific exemptions pursuant to Article 85(3), the Commission may grant an industry-wide exemption or block exemption that removes the conduct proscibed in
the regulation from scrutiny under Article 85 (1). The block exemption regulations are issued by the Commission pursuant to a
grant of specific authority by the Council.94 The Commission
has used block exemptions extensively to pave the way for liberalization of civil aviation, balancing at least three policies: the
interests of consumers, the interests of the airlines, and the social benefits of a progressive transition to a free market. As of
the date of publication of this Comment, after the third liberalization package, the remaining block exemptions include computer reservation systems95 and airline cooperation agreements.
The latter exemption has been limited in scope and eligibility
since 1993.96 For example, the agreement may not cover shared
See Dempsey, supra note 50, at 330.
See Basedow, supra note 18, at 260.
95 See Cavani, supra note 85.
96 See Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 85; see generally Duchene,
supra note 56, at 148-49.
93
94
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capacity,9 7 and joint capacity may not exceed a limited number
of seats per year. 98
The overall problem with the mechanism of exemptions, as
implemented by the E.U. Commission, is the resulting involvement of the Commission itself.
[A] conspicuous feature of block exemptions in the air transport
sector is that the E.C. Commission itself gets involved in anticompetitive practices. With regard to consultations on tariff, slot
allocation and airport scheduling, the Commission grants exemptions only when it is given ten days notice and is entitled to
send observers. 9 9

It is astonishing to find at the same table both the members of a
cartel and the members of "the single most important Community anti-trust institution, which serves as the Community's law
enforcement arm." 100
E.U. competition law applies where anti-competitive conduct
may "affect trade between Member States." 10 1 The extraterritorial reach of the competition rules is not mandated by the
text, 10 2 but interpretation by the Court ofJustice has resulted in
an approach that confers jurisdiction over agreements reached
outside the E.U. but implemented within. 10 3 For all practical
purposes, the Commission could, under this analytical scheme,
assert jurisdiction over trans-Atlantic alliances. Tickets are sold
within the European Union and, for some passengers, the transAtlantic flight is but one leg of a trip that originates or terminates in another Member State. Therefore, even absent any authority to negotiate air rights, the Commission can arguably
challenge the subsequent agreements between airlines resulting

See Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 85, art. 2.
98 See id. art. 3
99 Basedow, supra note 18, at 262-63.
100Wayne D. Collins, The Coming Age of EC Competition Policy, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
249, 255 (1991).
101 EC TarAi arts. 85, 86.
102 See Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 US/EC Competition Agreement: A Glimpse of the
Future Through the United States v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2J. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
149, 156 (1996).
103 See Case 125/85, In re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission,
1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) (non-European Community producers of wood pulp jointly fixed the price to charge to European Community
customers, and by selling to purchasers, implemented their price-fixing scheme
within the European Community); see also Keegan, supra note 102, at 157-58.
97
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agreements between a Member
from or relating to bilateral
10 4
State and a third country.

E.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The lack of political incentive to expand the multilateral system, initiated in Chicago in the shadow of the Convention,
caused the emergence of the bilateral regulatory framework as
the norm. Though there have been several standards with more
or less restrictive terms, typically a bilateral agreement will address capacity, fares and routes.1"5 Capacity is allocated or
shared between the respective carriers designated by the contracting states. The terms may be very rigid, or may allow for
some flexibility. Fares can be set directly by the bilateral agreement or deferred to the International Air Transport Association." 6 Routes are the destinations in the other country of
scheduled international flights. The bilateral agreement will
specifically address which air rights can be used to fly the routes.
For example, on the route from Chicago to Frankfurt, the U.S.
carrier would fly to Germany under the Fourth Freedom. If the
route, pursuant to the bilateral agreement, allows continuing
service to Berlin, then the carrier flies under the Fourth Freedom and "beyond point" rights. "Beyond point" connotes an
extension to a point beyond the point of entry in the same country. If the carrier can pick up additional traffic and fly to a third
country, it would do so under the Fifth Freedom right. If it can
pick up traffic on the inland leg, it also benefits from limited
cabotage rights. Any such right must be granted in the bilateral
agreement. 10 7 The number of carriers that can be nominated
for a route and the points of entry may be very limited. Competition is foreign to such arrangements; they are mostly allocative
of capacity and protective of airline interests. Because air rights
are a commodity, airline management or mismanagement supersedes consumers' preferences. Although market pressure
weighs heavily on route determination-no airline would will104

This extraterritorial authority is a point of contention between British Air-

ways and the Commission. See Charles Goldsmith, American Air and British Air
ST. J., Feb. 7, 1997, at Al IA.
105 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 12, at 435-36.

May Defy EU, WALL

106 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is an international association of air carriers that was organized to set international tariffs. IATA's
regulatory role ended in the 1970s. See Schless, supra note 10, at 441-42.
107 Some bilateral agreements are very restrictive and only allow Third and
Fourth Freedoms; some grant beyond rights and limited Fifth Freedom.
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ingly fly an empty plane-bilateral agreements generate, at best,
monopolistic conditions at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Fares and services are not fully competitive and tax revenue supports an inefficient state-owned or state-controlled
industry. In response to these inherent inefficiencies, the U.S.,
which pioneered airline deregulation, proposed a new bilateral
format: the Open Skies agreement.
F.

OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS

Open Skies agreements are bilateral agreements that fall
under the umbrella of the Open Skies policy of the United
States defined by a Department of Transportation (DOT) order
of August 1992.108 The following basic elements constitute
Open Skies under that order:
(1) Open entry on all routes;
(2) Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
(3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is, the right to operate service between any point in the United States and any point
in the European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate and beyond points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or the right to carry Fifth Freedom traffic;
(4) Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom
markets and in intra-E.C. markets: price matching rights in
third-country markets, and price leadership in third-country markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers in
those markets have it;
(5) Liberal charter arrangements (the least restrictive charter
regulations of the two governments would apply, regardless of
the origin of the flight);
(6) Liberal cargo regimes (criteria as comprehensive as those defined for the combination carriers);
(7) Conversion and remittance arrangements (Carriers would be
able to convert earnings and remit in hard currency promptly
and without restriction);
(8) Open code-sharing opportunities;
(9) Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perform/control its airport functions going to support its operations);
(10) Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities,
user charges, fair competition and intermodal rights; and
(11) Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of
and access for computer reservation systems.10 9
108 See Dep't of Transp. Order No. 92-8-13, supra note 29; Ace Model Bilateral
Air Transport Agreement ("Open Skies"), 35 I.L.M. 1479 (1996).
109 See Hedlund, supra note 9, at 299 n.72.
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The United States signed the first Open Skies agreement with
the Netherlands in October 1992.110 Conforming to DOT policy, this agreement "gives U.S. and Dutch airlines open entry
into each other's markets, unrestricted capacity and frequency
on all routes and the greatest possible degree of freedom in setting fares.""1 ' Similar agreements were signed with other European countries, including Austria, Czech Republic, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Iceland.1 2 Each of these agreements grant unrestricted access and Fifth Freedom rights traffic. This means
that international routes between the signatory states are solely
determined by the airlines;1 3 in other words, by market
conditions.
Although this greatly improves competition on the trans-Atlantic routes, this still does not mean deregulation of the international market. First, restrictive national regulations limit and
constrain the operation of fully efficient hub and spoke systems.
Second, any flight from an Open Skies signatory state to a nonsignatory state is subject to the terms of the traditional bilateral
agreement between the third state and the carrier's national
state. Therefore, since the airlines do not have free access to the
respective countries' internal markets, they remain unable to
feed international routes at the lowest possible cost.' 14 Consumers thus continue to pay non-competitive prices and are limited
in their choices of routes or flight schedules in planning their
travel arrangements.
G.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES

(GATS)

Internationalization of the legal framework of civil aviation, at
least conceptually, reached an unprecedented level through the
inclusion of limited air rights in the General Agreement On
Trade In Services (GATS)." 5 The only air services included in
GATS are soft rights, " 6 and chances of expanding its scope to
110 See id. at 298.
111 Id. at 271.
112 See Air Transport Agreement, June 14, 1995, U.S.-Aus., 1896 U.N.T.S. 278.
113 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 12, at 436, 456.
114 Airlines circumvent some of these restrictions through code-sharing and

joint-marketing agreements. See generally Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control:
Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy into theJet Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143
(1994).
115 See GATT URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R.
Doc. No. 195, 103d Cong., (1994).
116 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 12, at 437.
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include hard rights is unlikely, if not impossible, because the
Most Favored Nation (MFN) provision would indirectly have the
pernicious effect of eliminating any incentive or pressure to liberalize the industry. Indeed, the most liberal terms of any bilateral agreement would automatically extend to all GATS
members. Countries with sophisticated aviation markets would
completely lose their ability to pressure developing countries to
open their skies or to prevent their airlines from "free riding" in
more lucrative markets. Safety and security standards, would
also be fundamentally compromised. 17 In view of the fact that
international civil aviation is heavily concentrated in specific
markets, the chances or the need to include hard rights into
GATS appear, at this time, marginal at best.
III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE MULTIPLICATION OF
BILATERAL OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS ON THE
ATLANTIC ROUTES
The proliferation of bilateral Open Skies agreements in Europe, granting very liberal air rights has resulted in two diametrically opposed views. On one hand, it has been said that "[t]he
United States has already given far too much and received far
too little in return." 18 Others, such as the E.U. institutions, crit117 See id. at 437-38. Vamos-Golman nonetheless suggests that GATS and Chicago Convention principles can be reconciled through a system of a multilateral
agreements which would annex the respective bilateral agreements. Such a system would not be subject to MFN, but would offer a general framework in which
bilateral agreements would evolve on a predetermined path, under the auspices
of ICAO and WTO, toward a structured multilateral system. See id. at 439. See also

Tycho H.E. Stahl, LiberalizingInternationalTrade In Service: The Casefor Sidestepping
the GATT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 452-53 (1994) (arguing strongly against ex-

tending GATT to services). For a comparative analysis of competitive rules under
the scheme of bilateral agreements and the WTO, see Abeyratne, supra note 12,
at 793.
118 Angela Edwards, ForeignInvestments in the U.S. Airline Industry: Friend or Foe?,

9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 595, 618 (1995). Edwards proposes that there can be no
reciprocity through bilateral agreements because the United States aviation market has no equivalent anywhere in the world, and therefore, no country can offer
corresponding competitive opportunities in its own market. See id. at 640-45. Edwards views the success of American carriers in international markets as indicating a need to restrict access of foreign carriers to the U.S. domestic markets
through cabotage or foreign ownership. See id. "IT]he fear of seeing U.S. dominance of the airline industry slip away, much as it has in the automobile and steel
industries, compels the United States to take this position." Id. at 642. Edwards
concludes with the non sequitur that "foreign investment will mean that the already rapidly declining U.S. airline industry will be forced to watch helplessly as
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icize the U.S. Open Skies policy as excessively benefiting American interests. 119
A.

CRITICISM BY THE EuRPFAN UNION INSTITUTIONS OF
BILATERAL OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS

Though the Open Skies policy of the U.S. was meant to bring
free competition into the international civil aviation sector, 120
the European institutions now see it as granting undue advantage to the American carriers. Under bilateral Open Skies
agreements, parties grant each other Fifth Freedom rights, 121
and the cumulative effect of multiple Open Skies agreements
with the E.U. Member States would be to "endanger the whole
process of deregulation of Europe's civil aviation market."12 2 As
it stands now, although a carrier of an Open Skies signatory
state can nominate any international airport in the U.S. as its
port of entry, under U.S. law, 123 it does not have access to cabotage. 124 Cabotage is "the transportation of passenger, cargo or
mail by a foreign airline between two points in the same nation."11 5 Therefore, even though the U.S. appears generous in
granting foreign carriers a wide choice of landing in exchange
for a geographically unequal choice of landing in a small (or
not-so-small) European country, the scale tips in favor of American carriers if Fifth Freedom rights allow them to build and control a network of routes based on "hub and spoke" operations in
the E.U.126 For example, Frankfurt is becoming a hub for U.S.
domestic markets disintegrate and the ability to compete effectively becomes increasingly difficult." Id. at 643.
119 See id. at 631. See also Scott Kimpel, Comment, Antitrust Considerations in
InternationalAirline Alliances, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. (forthcoming 1997) (also discussing Open Skies agreements and detailing the antitrust implications of airline
alliances on both sides of the Atlantic).
120 See Defining "Open Skies," supra note 29, at 3. For an in-depth analysis and

critique of the DOT foreign policies through 1992, see Thomas D. Grant, Foreign
Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process, Problems, and Progress,31 HARV.

J. ON LEGIS. 63, 77-91 (1993). "[B]y excluding cabotage and ownership/control,
[DOT] has stayed or even reversed the trend toward trade liberalization ......
Id. at 91.
121 See supra note 18.
122 Neil Kinnock, Speech to the Association of European Airlines, Luxembourg (April 28, 1995), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File [hereinafter Kinnock Speech].
123 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1992).
124 See id.
125 Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegrationof the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 TRANSP. L.J.

9, 29 (1991).

126 Kinnock

Speech, supra note 122.
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traffic to Eastern Europe. The United States, on the other
hand, as a single and sizable market, does not offer the opportunity for European carriers to derive, from Fifth Freedom rights,
the ability to build "hub and spoke" operations. Ownership of
domestic carriers is restricted by law. Consequently, in an effort
to simulate "hub and spoke" systems, carriers have developed
code-sharing agreements, cooperation
agreements, alliances,
27
and franchise arrangements.
Another concern for European carriers is the difference in
antitrust exigencies in the U.S. that would put European carriers
at a substantial disadvantage in the U.S. market. 128 The E.U. antitrust policy 129 is an integral part of the European integration
process and goes beyond the concept of interstate commerce to
include attempts at social engineering. Social cost and regional
development are fundamental parameters in measuring acceptable distortions to competition in the exemption process under
Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty. 130 European social considerations go far beyond the rule of reason analysis of U.S. antitrust
enforcement. In this respect, if European airlines were to enter
the U.S. domestic market, to the extent these anti-competitive
arrangements at home impact their ability to compete in the
U.S., they would be reviewable under U.S. antitrust standards. It
is also worth noting that the E.U. Commission, because of its
involvement with airline cartel-like activity through its exemption policy, might have to seek U.S. immunity for itself.
127
TION

SeeJohn D. Morroco & Carole A. Shiftin, Airlines Duel As Talks Resume, AVIAWK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 9, 1996, at 38.

128 European carriers do not benefit from block antitrust immunity in the U.S.
Ownership restrictions are also more stringent in the United States. The DOT
and the Department ofJustice review agreements between airlines on a case-bycase basis for antitrust compliance. For a recent example, see DOT Order to
Show Cause, 96-5-26, OST-95-618 (regarding the joint application of Delta, SwissAir, Sabena and Austrian Airlines for approval of, and Antitrust Immunity for
Alliance Agreements pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308 and 41309).
129 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
130 See Commission Decision 96/180/EC of 16 January 1996 Granting Exemption to the Joint Venture Agreement between Deutsche Lufthansa A.G. (Lufthansa) and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) to Offer Scheduled Air
Transport Access Between Germany and Scandinavia, 1996 O.J. (L 54) 1. The
Commission found the joint venture agreement in violation of Article 85(1) but
beneficial to consumers, provided certain conditions applied on routes with
more than 30,000 seats per year. Competition on routes with less than 30,000
seats is not considered beneficial per se, because the regional interest prevails
over the potential benefit of competition. See Council Regulation 2408/92, supra
note 64.
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In addition, under European licensing requirements," foreign ownership is limited to forty-nine percent,1 3 2 while U.S. law
limits foreign ownership to twenty-five percent.1 33 Simply stated,
it is structurally, economically and legally easier for American
carriers to penetrate the European market than for European
carriers to gain a share of the United States market.
Finally, for internal political reasons, the European Union
would like to keep control over the pace of the liberalization of
the European civil aviation market. For instance, Italy is still
struggling with the privatization of its flag carrier and does not
want to be forced into hasty decisions. 34 Because the European
Union is not a federalized state, self-serving political concerns
weigh heavily in balancing the interests of the Community and
the Member States, regardless of the clear commitment of the
European institutions to achieve a free market.
All of these considerations comprise the underlying forces
that led the European Union Member States to grant the mandate to the Commission. Nonetheless, the same considerations
viewed in the light of self-serving interests led to the limitations
imposed on the authority of the Commission under the
mandate.
Thus, European criticism of DOT policies is not altogether
justified. American carriers' success cannot realistically be
blamed solely on policies when, at the same time, American carriers show substantial advances in efficiently controlling costs
compared to European carriers. 135 Furthermore, it is quite a
stretch to attribute the disproportionate share of U.S. carriers
on the trans-Atlantic routes to Open Skies agreements, when
such disparity existed already under classic bilateral agreements.1 3 6 Finally, the shortcomings of the E.U.'s internal liberalization bear more heavily on the future of the European
carriers' ability to compete in the international sector than the
131 See Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 64.

See Duchene, supra note 56, at 124.
See 49 U.S.C. app §§ 1301-1557 (1992). DOT's willingness to pursue its liberal interpretation of ownership restrictions under the KLM-Northwest scheme,
DOT Order 91-1-41, has not been tested lately. The DOT distinguished between
voting equity limited to 25% and total foreign equity limited to 49% in a decision
generally perceived as a reward to the Netherlands. See Grant, supra note 120, at
86-87.
132
133

134

See Kinnock, supra note 8.

In 1994, American carriers' costs were 48% lower than European carriers'
costs on a mile per passenger basis. See Edwards, supra note 118, at 615.
135

136

See id. at 614-15.
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of air traffic between the U.S. and the
politics of liberalization
13 7
E.U. Member States.
The principal obstacles that stand in the way of the liberalization of the European air space and, ultimately, trans-Atlantic air
space, are not only the privatization of flag carriers, ground handling, air traffic management and slot allocation as stated by the
European Transport Commissioner,13 8 but also the political failure to enforce sound antitrust policies. A fundamental policy
shift in applying competition rules to the airline industry is
needed. Privatization and antitrust enforcement in the E.U.
and relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions in both the U.S.
and the E.U. are the keys to successful multi-lateralization of international air service between the E.U. and the U.S. Successful
multi-lateralization will mean better fares and service for consumers, better utilization of scarce resources by airlines (routes
and airports are congested), better opportunity for regulatory
authorities to standardize licensing requirements in order to
meet the safety and environmental concerns of air traffic, and
less waste of governmental resources, whether in the form of
subsidies, or more simply in the cost of monitoring and enforcing complex regulatory schemes. These are policy matters, not
just air rights, that go far beyond the bottom line of a given airline. These are the true issues to be addressed, negotiated and
eventually agreed upon between the U.S. and the E.U. In this
respect, much is owed to President Carter's initiative in the late
1970s, when he offered to trade access rights to the U.S. market
for commitments to apply and139enforce competition rules in the
international aviation sector.

137

See Basedow, supra note 18, at 263-64. The European liberalization process

did not produce the far-reaching effects of the U.S. deregulation of civil aviation,
but that was also the very stated goal of the progressive liberalization implemented through the three packages. As a result, the structures of the U.S. and
the European markets are still notably different, regardless of the many political
differences on which the U.S. is banking to reach Open Skies agreements with
specific countries rather than with the European Community as a whole. Professor Basedow strongly urges a straight-forward application of competition rules,
doing away with all block exemptions. See id. In essence, this would mean a move

away from liberalizing toward deregulation. See id.
138 See Kinnock, supra note 8.
139 The Carter administration's policy was to trade landing slots at U.S. airports
for increased competition in pricing. See Edwards, supra note 118, at 606.

276

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
B.

ANALYSIS OF THE MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION TO

NEGOTIATE A MULTILATERAL OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT

The Council of Transport ministers granted the Commission
a nonexclusive mandate to negotiate a multilateral air transportation agreement between the U.S. and the E.U. 14 ° The mandate does not allow the Commission to negotiate routes or
access rights, but instead extends to matters that no individual
Member State can address on its own: foreign ownership restrictions and cabotage. Antecedent to the questions of what and
how to negotiate lies the question of the authority of the negotiator. Professor Basedow, relying on the European Court of Justice, argued in 1994 that "the Community gains implied powers
to negotiate with third states in all areas where it has adopted
measures to pursue a mandate of the [EC] Treaty." 4 ' The
Court ofJustice, in a later opinion, held that "there is nothing in
the Treaty which prevents [the council] from arranging . . .
concerted action in relation to non-member countries or from
prescribing the approach to be taken by the Member States in
their external dealings."' 142 There is, thus, no requirement for
exclusive competence, and the Council could concomitantly
grant a mandate to the Commission and allow Member States to
carry on separate bilateral negotiations. 143 The U.S. Department of Transportation, therefore, should not let the intricacy
of European Union law stand in the way of an opportunity to
move ahead toward an internationalization of the civil aviation
legal framework.
See Commission's Multilateralism Mandate, supra note 1.
See Basedow, supra note 18, at 274. Professor Basedow outlines the procedure applicable to the exercise of such competence under the EC Treaty. See id.
at 275-76.
142 Opinion 1/94, Nov. 15, 1994, reprinted in part at 34 I.L.M. 689, 711 (1995).
The court questioned the commission's assertion "that the Member States' continuing freedom to conduct an external policy based on bilateral agreements
with non member countries will inevitably lead to distortions in the flow of services and will progressively undermine the internal market." Id. The opinion answers the question of the competence of the Community to conclude the
multilateral agreements of the Uruguay Round, which included GATS, by holding that "[t]he Community has sole competence, pursuant to Article 113 of the
EC Treaty, to conclude the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods. [In addition, the] Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude
GATS." Id. at 717. The court found that article 113 does not apply to services.
See id.
143 See id. at 716.
140
141

19971
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BARGAINING CHIPS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The internal liberalization of the European market was initiated well before the first Open Skies agreement was entered
into between the Netherlands and the United States.144 The
E.U. Commission, therefore, did not anticipate that the very implementation of the liberalization packages would lead to the
erosion of substantive bargaining chips in future negotiations of
multilateral agreements.145 Forty percent of trans-Atlantic
routes are subject to existing Open Skies agreements. Furthermore, thirty percent of the routes represent traffic between the
U.S. and the United Kingdom who are currently negotiating
their own Open Skies agreement. The impact that a multilateral agreement would have is therefore no greater than thirty
percent. It is hardly enough to make the Commission, on its
face, a valid interlocutory to negotiate traffic rights to E.U.
countries.
The European deregulation policy has limited Member
States' ability to subsidize their national carriers 14 6 and has progressively implemented free cabotage among Member States. In
and of itself, this policy gave sufficient motivation to smaller
countries, who had little expectation to see their national carriers succeed in a competitive environment, to enter into bilateral
agreements with the United States and sell off interests in their
national carriers. Some even went as far as selling interests in
their flag carrier to U.S. airlines. 147 The separate ultraliberal
Open Skies agreements between the United States and Belgium,
144 See Kinnock, supra note 8.

145 See supra note 52.
146 The liberalization packages do not contain any explicit provisions regarding state aid, but the Commission has grown increasingly inquisitive in applying

Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. See Applications of Articles 92 and 93 of the
EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EAA Agreement to State Aids in the Aviation
Sector, 1994 O.J. (C 350) 5, 10, 12. In allowing Spain's latest capital injection in
Iberia, the Commission heeded the strong warning that it "could not authorize
the granting of additional aid otherwise than in exceptional and unforeseeable
circumstances beyond the control of the company." Commission Decision of 31
January 1996, 1996 O.J. (L 104) 41. See also supra note 23 (discussing state aid to
airlines generally).
147 If the bilateral Open Skies agreement between the Netherlands and the
United States was an incentive or an opportunity for KLM to acquire an interest
in Northwest Airlines, the need to privatize Sabena was the opportunity to promote Brussels Airport and therefore for Belgium to enter into a bilateral agreement with the United States notwithstanding the strong objections of the
European Commission. U.S. Open Skies Bid Makes Many Europeansjittery, AvL4TION EUROPE, Feb. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2274322.
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Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Austria, concluded in 1995, illustrate this pernicious twist, brought upon
themselves by the European institutions.'48
The E.U. Commission, prior to securing its mandate, had
threatened to challenge, in the European Court of Justice, the
legality of these bilateral Open Skies agreements under the EC
Treaty.'4 9 The Commission can probably make out a good case
building on the Court of Justice's precedents. In the Ahmed
Saeed case,1 50 the European Court of Justice held that Article
85(1) and Article 86 apply across the board to domestic, intraE.U. flights as well as to flights between a Member State and a
non-member state.' 51 In addition, the Court held that the approval by a state of air fares violating Articles 85 or 86, as qualified by E.U. regulations, infringes upon the Member States'
obligations under Articles 5 and 90(1) of the Treaty.'52 Expanding on this holding, the Commission could argue that a
bilateral Open Skies agreement, to the extent it contains provisions that contradict or limit the terms of E.U. regulations, constitutes a violation by the signatory Member State of its
obligations under Articles 5 and 90(1) of the Treaty. Further,
the nationality provisions of bilateral agreements, to the extent
they exclude nationals of other Member States, apparently also
violate Article 6 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits "within the
scope of the application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination
based on grounds of nationality."' 5

Nonetheless, in view of the

Court ofJustice decision In re Community Competence,1 54 this argument may loose its impetus.' 55 Arguably, the concurrent compe148 See supra notes 112-13. In addition, the Commission's success in negotiating and concluding a bilateral agreement between the Community and Norway
and Sweden in 1992 could have served as a precedent. See Council Regulation
92/384, Concerning the Conclusion of Agreement Between the European Community, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden on Civil Aviation,
1992 OJ. (L 200) 20, 21; see also Basedow, supra note 18, at 272.
149 See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 63, at 505.
150 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Sentale zur Bekaempfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 E.C.R. 838.
'5' See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 63, at 513-19. British Airways, however,
continues to maintain that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over its
alliance with American Airlines.
152 See id. at 516.
1'5 EC TREATV art. 6.
154 Case 1/94, In re Community Competence, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5276, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 205 (1994).
155 See Basedow, supra note 18, at 270-71.
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tence of the individual Member States would be meaningless if
the Commission could trump bilateral agreements because they
benefit the negotiating Member State's national carriers. On
the other hand, one can also reason that the principle of nondiscrimination was bargained in 1957 and cannot be recaptured
merely because community standards are not yet formulated.
To up the ante, the Commission could also argue that it has
15 6
the authority, under the Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation
to review the terms of cooperation-ownership agreements of the
kind entered into between KLM and Northwest or, more recently, between American Airlines and British Airways. Neil Kinnock has clearly stated that such challenges are not mere
displays of political virility. 5 7v At this stage in the negotiations
between the E.U. and the U.S., however, threats with respect to
existing arrangements are not openly expressed. 15 8 Even more
so, the mandate implies that, to the extent Open Skies agreements are more liberal, the goal of the negotiations is to not
revert to less liberal conditions.
With respect to future or pending arrangements, the Commission is flexing its antitrust enforcement muscles. On January 10,
1997, Karl Van Miert, E.U. Competition Commissioner, warned
the U.K. government of legal action if the British Airways-American Airlines alliance received clearance.159 The U.S. negotiators, on their part, have made clear that "[t]here can be no
fruitful discussion on this subject [Open Skies] unless both sides
can make and accept offers on core issues."160 The core issue in
the U.S. view is that the European Commission is not authorized
to negotiate all aspects of the DOT standard Open Skies agreement. These include routes, capacity, pricing, and slots. In
other words, if the Commission has nothing else to offer than
soft rights, which are already largely covered under traditional
bilateral agreements, there is no incentive for the United States
to bargain. The Commission may, therefore, be tempted to review, and possibly restate, its position with respect to antitrust
156 See Council Regulation 4064/89, on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, amended by 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14. See supra
notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
157 See Kinnock Speech, supra note 122.
158 See Kinnock, supra note 8.
159 See Shailagh Murray, Turbulence Hits BA-American Alliance, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Jan. 14, 1997, at 6.
160Statement of Charles Hunnicutt, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Aviation and
International Affairs (quoted in U.S. Official Sees No Open Skies Without Changes in

Core Positions, AVIATION EUROPE, Oct. 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10773936).
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matters under E.U. law relating to alliances between American
and European carriers. It would indeed require more than simply stating a new policy; present regulations provide for exemptions under Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty."' It is, nonetheless,
the most valuable chip that the Commission could bring to the
bargaining table. As discussed earlier, the Commission has already announced its intention to review the British AirwaysAmerican Airlines alliance. The Delta-Sabena-SwissAir-Austrian
Airlines partnership and the Lufthansa-United-SAS partnership
have also been earmarked for scrutiny.1 6 2 The Commission can
hardly say that its intent to review the British Airways-American
Airlines alliance is not motivated by its effort to gain authority
over external relations, nor can it treat one alliance differently
without undermining its own credibility.
D.

THE VESTED INTERESTS OF THE U.S.

1. Existing Open Skies Agreements
Since 1992, the U.S. has successfully entered into Open Skies
agreements with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Iceland.' 63 As demonstrated above, these agreements have
assisted U.S carriers in gaining a solid foothold in the European
Union. As it stands, these agreements have managed to secure
not only the soft rights that the E.U. Commission is willing to
negotiate but also some hard rights (about forty percent of the
routes between the U.S. and E.U.), that the E.U. Commission is
not offering in the first stage of the negotiation 164 such as Fifth
Freedom and route access rights.
2. Negotiations In ProgressFor Open Skies Agreements
The U.S. and the United Kingdom are currently negotiating
an Open Skies agreement, the success of which the U.S. has
made a condition precedent to antitrust review of the British
Council Regulation 3975/87 of Dec. 14, 1987 lays down the procedure for
the application of the rules on competition in the air sector, as last amended by
Regulation 2410/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240).
162 American-BA, Behind Schedule, Waits for Government to Move, AVIATION EUROPE,
October 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10774015.
163 See Air Transport Agreement, supra note 112.
64 See U.S. Pursues Open Skies on All Available Fronts, Succeeds inJordan, AVIATION
161

DAILY, Nov. 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11116132.
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Airways-American Airlines agreement. 6 5 A fundamental issue
raised by this agreement is slot allocation at Heathrow Airport, 166 one of the busiest airports in the world. Slot allocation,

however, is getting more and more complicated. The alliance's
competitors are seeking a chance to force it to release slots, and
lobbying is the activity of the day. The DOT has indicated that
thirty-two slots would have to be freed up for other airlines; the
U.K. Merger Commission has raised this figure to 168, and the
E.U. Commission has expressed, in Karl Van Miert's letter, that
this latter figure is completely inadequate.'" A related issue is
whether the alliance may sell these slots or whether it must surrender them without compensation.' 68 Spain, after repeated efforts to refinance its flag carrier with government subsidies, has
finally expressed interest in negotiating an Open Skies agreement as well. 169 For the E.U. Commission, the more hardly
means the merrier.
3. Foreign Ownership Restrictions
In order to operate a commercial aircraft in the domestic U.S.
market, an airline must satisfy the citizenship requirement
under the Federal Aviation Act. 70 Two criteria must be satis165 See The Skies Darken Between London and Washington, European Information
Service, September 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Allnews File.
166 See id. See also Sue Beenstock, Jet Set: A Tale of Two Airlines, P.R. WEEK, Jan.
31, 1987. British Airways claims that the short supply of slots is untrue. Conversely, Commissioner Van Miert claims that competition will be eliminated on
13 U.K. to U.S. routes. See id.
167 See Murray, supra note 159.
168 Regulation 2408/92 on slot allocation is unclear. The 168 slots on the gray
market (there is no official market) are valued at $180 million. The Council is
also expected to issue a new slot allocation by the end of 1997. See id.
169 On Spain's repeated efforts to subsidize Iberia, see Randall D. Lehner, Protectionism, Prestige, and National Security: The Alliance Against Multilateral Trade in
InternationalAir Transport,45 DuKE LJ. 436, 454-55 (1995). See also Commission
Decision, supra note 146 (relating to Spain's recapitalization of Iberia).
170 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1992), which defines a U.S. citizen as:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its
possessions, or
(b) a partnership of which each member is such an individual, or
(c) a corporation or association created or organized under the
laws of the United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States, of which the president and two-thirds or more of
the board of directors and other managing officers thereof are
such individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting
interest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the
United States or of one of its possessions.
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fled: (1) U.S. citizens must control seventy-five percent of the
voting rights, and (2) U.S. citizens must actually control the airline. The control component of the test is the object of a case
by case review by Department of Transportation. 1 ' Sovereignty
traditional justificlaims and national security concerns are17the
2
restrictions.
ownership
foreign
cation for
Sovereignty, however, would not be challenged if ownership
restrictions did not exist; the policing powers of a state over its
air space have little to do with the ownership of airlines. Countries without national airlines still have sovereignty over their air
space. The right to regulate access to and use of the airspace
cannot legitimately serve as a proxy for national protectionism.
National security concerns raise a completely different set of issues. The fear of disseminating military and technological
secrets, of terrorism, and of foreign aircraft in the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) are often cited justifications. 173 Civil aviation,
however, parted ways with its military cousin decades ago; 1 74 the
technology is widely available; 175 terrorism has more to do with
airport security than airline ownership, and CRAF is a voluntary
program set up by the Department of Defense.176 "[N]ational
security .. . [is] no more legitimate a basis for protection of
airlines than [it was] for ...steel." 177 The argument of national
security does sound rather hollow. First, little would be lost in
raising the limit of foreign ownership to forty-nine percent to
match the European licensing requirement. Clearly, the more
171 See Edwards, supra note 118, at 610-14; Grant, supra note 120, at 91-101 (discussing DOT decisions). Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (2.2) (24), a "foreign air
carrier must obtain a permit from DOT." See also 14 C.F.R. § 211 (1996). See
generally Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Contracts on ForeignInvestment
and Operations: How Much is Enough?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 417, 445-49
(1994).
172 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(a) affirms "[t]hat the United States of America is
hereby declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive sovereignty in
the airspace of the United States ......
173 See Grant, supra note 120, at 73; Lehner, supra note 169, at 450; Edwards,
supra note 118, at 639-42.
174 See Grant, supra note 120, at 73.
175 See id.
176 See Edwards, supra note 118, at 639-40.
177 Lehner, supra note 169, at 448. Lehner analogizes the arguments that the
steel industry articulated when it sought protection from foreign competition,
with the justifications advanced in restriction of foreign ownership of airlines.
"[E]ven if legitimate" from a defense posture "the national security argument is a
weak one at best to explain the reluctance of states and industry ....The Chicago Convention itself contains provisions dealing with national security and
emergencies." Id. at 451.
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believable concern with respect to international mergers, not
unlike national mergers, goes to possible distortion of competition resulting from an acquisition rather than to the mere
change of control. Further, safety of aircraft would not be affected, and neither maintenance requirements nor pilot licensing standards are at stake here. Second, air control and air
space safety have improved considerably since the early age of
aviation. Third, restrictions on ownership raise the cost of capital for U.S. airlines, which may affect the viability of American
carriers. Potentially, this could mean fewer jobs, less competition and higher fares in the U.S. aviation industry.
4.

Cabotage Restrictions

U.S. law provides that, although foreign civil aircraft are permitted to navigate in the U.S., 78 they shall not take on, at any
point within the U.S., persons, property, or mail destined for
another point within the U.S. 1 79 In other words, cabotage in the
U.S. is reserved for American carriers. U.S. airlines are not eager to relinquish this privilege of a captive market, the largest
single aviation market in the world. Foreign ownership restrictions and cabotage restrictions are closely intertwined; no foreigner may own an American carrier, and only American
carriers can exercise cabotage rights.
Cabotage is the bread and butter for most carriers in the U.S.,
and opening that market all at once could undoubtedly have
far-reaching effects on the operations of domestic carriers. Most
of the economical trimming, however, was achieved with deregulation, and it is quite unlikely that European carriers with
higher average operating costs could compete efficiently in the
domestic U.S. market. Therefore, the far-reaching effects are
quite unlikely to be realized but, for the sake of caution, the
risks, if any, can be readily controlled if access to cabotage is
freed in stages. First, foreign ownership could be relaxed; second, cabotage could be limited to one inland leg of European
carriers' flights. Assuming these benefits are traded for strict
compliance with antitrust principles, a complete ban on state
subsidies and similar rights for U.S. carriers in the E.U., two substantial benefits would be derived for American civil aviation:
Europeans would gain a stake in the stability of U.S. aviation
178 This is subject to a permit issued by DOT. See supra note 108 and accompa-

nying text.
'79 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(b) (1992).
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through increased ownership, and economically unsound European carriers would have to yield routes, access and slots to
more competitive airlines, which would likely be American carriers. On a more level playing field, American companies, especially American airlines that survived the deregulation process,
should stand to gain rather than to lose.
IV.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION: FROM OPEN
SKIES TO OPEN MARKETS
The liberalized European internal market is still functionally a
relatively non-competitive market. New E.U. regulations, anticipated in late 1997, are expected to address ground-handling, air
traffic management, and slot allocation. This third element is
crucial to the economic benefits expected from Open Skies
agreements, for without slots, there is no meaningful access to
air rights. Only the Commission can legislate to create an official market for slots at European airports. An Open Skies agreement with the U.K. will change little in the market conditions
for U.S. carriers if slots at Heathrow do not become negotiable
commodities. The uncertainty surrounding the Commission's
jurisdiction over international alliances further hampers progress. Similarly, any threat by the E.U. Commission to challenge, under the competition rules, the effects of Open Skies
agreements creates unsettling conditions.
On the other hand, the European institutions' unwillingness
(or inability) to eliminate, once and for all, subsidies and state
aids to unprofitable carriers necessarily distorts competition on
international routes. For the same reasons, the Commission's
liberal grants of exemptions from E.U. competition rules favors
European carriers competing with U.S. carriers for trans-Atlantic customers.
The Commission's mandate covers all the issues raised above,
and the Commission has expressed a desire to discuss ownership
restrictions. Such restrictions typify protectionism and protectionist mentalities which can hardly be justified in a globalized
market. At a time when the U.S. airline industry has returned to
profitability, ownership restrictions are even more difficult to
justify other than by nationalism. Conversely, the profitability of
U.S. airlines would put them at an advantage should ownership
restrictions be lifted on both sides of the Atlantic.
For these reasons, the Department of Transportation should
actively pursue negotiations with the European Commission
with respect to soft rights and ownership restrictions. Increased
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soft rights will enhance the economic value of existing and future Open Skies agreements and the privatization of European
flag carriers in a subsidy-free market can only benefit the more
efficient U.S. carriers. In addition, easing ownership restrictions
in the U.S. should lower the cost of capital for domestic carriers.
However, to prevent a repeat of the turmoil that followed the
U.S. deregulation initiative, cabotage restrictions should not be
lifted all at once in order to put a premium on existing carriers
and existing American jobs. U.S. airlines with routes to Europe,
international ambitions, or need for capital should come to the
realization that their best ally is the European Commission enforcing sound competition rules in a scheme of multilateral
Open Skies conditions.
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